AVPP BMS side event

Report on Preventing and Reducing Armed Violence: Addressing the supply and demand of Small Arms and Light Weapons

By Shauna Kelley and Christian Ciobanu

On Friday, June 18, 2010, the UN Armed Violence Prevention Programme (AVPP), a joint initiative by UNDP, WHO, UNICEF, UN-HABITAT, UNODC, and UNODA presented a discussion entitled, Preventing and Reducing Armed Violence: Addressing the supply and demand of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Mr. Alex Butchart, a representative of WHO; and Mrs. Judy Grayson, a representative of UNICEF, were the moderators of this program. H.E. Francis T. Kimmemia, Permanent Security of the Ministry of State Internal Security and Provincial Administration in Kenya, Africa; Samuel Blake, Director of the Organized Crime Branch, a division of the Jamaica Security; and Denis Mize, Executive Director of Sou de Paz, served as the speakers for the event.

Mr. Butchart noted that the AVPP program is focused on reducing armed violence by creating; policy strategies, and monitoring the implementation of these practices in crisis areas. The AVPP also follows a multi-sectoral approach to ensure that it can significantly improve an area. This approach means that different UN agencies contribute to the program.

After presenting information about the AVPP program, Mr. Butchart presented a documentary entitled, Faces of Violence. This documentary juxtaposed the urban armed violence in Rio, Brazil with the situation in the Sudan. The documentary also demonstrated how two men were able to overcome gang violence to become strong role models for children and adolescents.

Following Mr. Butchart, H.E. Francis Kimemia gave his presentation, which focused on reducing armed violence in Kenya. He informed the audience that his presentation would touch upon the following: the situation in Kenya, regional problems in Africa, drivers of gun ownership, Kenya’s national framework, addressing the demand and supply for SALW, and lessons that can be learned from Kenya’s experience with SALWs.

In terms of the situation in Kenya, he explained that illicit SALWs are a serious threat for agrarian communities. They are a serious threat because over 80 percent of illicit SALWs can be found in Kenya’s pastoral communities. However, there has been a recent escalation of SALWs in urban centers, especially in Mombasa, Kenya.

Noting the regional problems in Africa, Kimemia informed the audience that, due to the state of anarchy in Somalia, illicit arms dealers have been supplying SALWs to civilians for years. Moreover, in South Sudan illicit arms dealers have supplied arms to religious leaders and civilians who have been trying to secure their resources in the area. In Uganda, there has been an influx of organized crime gangs, who have engaged in cattle rustling and stealing supplies from civilians.

Regarding the drivers of gun ownership among Africans, Kimemia stated that tensions between ethnic groups and competition for limited resources are the primary reasons why Africans obtain SALWs. Moreover, he mentioned that poverty, unemployment, and an inadequate security from various governments are forcing Africans to purchase weapons.

Given that most Africans are either obtaining weapons or engaging in the illicit trade of SALW, Kenya implemented its National Framework on SALW. This national framework required the government to work with local NGOs to educate civilians about the problems of SALW, establish weapons collection and disarmament centres, and create youth program and implement gender mainstreaming programs. It further mandated the Kenyan police to be stationed at several border points. The programme further stipulated that Kenya must establish and enforce a culture of peace in conflict regions of the country. Finally, the program encourages Kenyans to find new sources of income other than selling SALWs.

To address the demand of SALWs, Kenya assessed the number of Kenyans who have guns. Kenya used the information to create detailed maps to determine the areas with the highest concentration of SALWs. In addition, Kenya ordered its police to monitor situations in underserved communities. Finally, it committed its resources to targeting SALW hotspots throughout the area.

Concerning the supply side of SALWs, Kenya has been engaging in joint border control initiatives with its neighbors. It further created programs to prevent younger Kenyans from participating in the transfer of SALWs.

Lastly, Kimemia implied that, based on Kenya’s experience with SALWs, Kenya has learned several lessons. These lessons include: the need for states to form partnerships to provide safety and security to their communities, regulate the flow of SALW into the countries, help their citizens to abandon their culture of violence by adopting a culture of peace. The other lessons focus on the importance for states to engage in systematic cross-border programs and establish early warning systems to detect illicit traffickers near their borders.

After Kimemia’s presentation, Samuel Blake, the Director of the Organized Crime Branch of the Ministry of National Security addressed how the Jamaica is trying to quell gun related violence in its country. He specified also that forty percent of health care spending in Jamaica is a result of gun violence.

He further mentioned that Jamaica uses Global Information Systems (GIS) technology for plotting violent crimes in problematic communities. The Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategies (CPCSS) were created under the auspices of UNDP and will be implemented by the government of Jamaica as a means of combating gun violence. CPCSS emphasizes the importance of the government and local communities sharing the responsibility of preventing armed violence.

As the last speaker, Denis Mizne, the Executive Director of Sou da Paz in Brazil, touched upon the most concentrated areas of armed violence in Brazil. Because there are multiple factors contributing to violence, the issue requires complex strategies by individuals, communities and States.

During his presentation, he posed two rhetorical questions, which were: “what do we offer as replacement of violence,” and “what are other forms of dealing with conflict?”

In response to these questions, he explained that police are the first to respond to violence, making law enforcement the initial actors of the State’s function in dealing with violence.

Then Mizne called attention to these initial interactions and their significance to crime prevention. How are the police relating to civil society? Ridicule and criticism of police performance have proven to be less constructive than giving rewards for good policing in San Paolo as a means of reforming and strengthening logic of law enforcement practices with the goal of empowering police to partner with civil society and to be a leader of change.

He also informed the audience that infrastructure plays a role in violence in Brazil and elsewhere. He claimed that prevention is partly derived in an examination of a community’s infrastructure including details like the absence of streetlights or a baseball field. Minze also described the misperceptions among the public that any social program is a violence prevention program and that all human rights programs are addressing violence.

As part of his concluding remarks, he announced that every gun seized or collected in a buy back program, should be destroyed.

A Brief Reprise

by Robert Zuber, Global Action to Prevent War

The 4th BMS is history and ODA officials, diplomats and civil society representatives now have a few days to answer email, do laundry and reintroduce themselves to their families before returning for the last part of the UN’s 2010 ‘disarmament trilogy.’ Formal negotiations on an Arms Trade Treaty will begin in mid-July, and while there is significant diplomatic insistence that this is ‘not a disarmament treaty,’ it is clear to many that the regulatory coherence provided by such a treaty could prove invaluable in efforts to ensure that arms transfers have maximum transparency and are used in a manner consistent with other state interests to protect human rights and protect civilian populations.

In several ways, the BMS debate previewed the ATT agenda. Both drying up existing stockpiles of older weapons and eliminating the potential for new traffic in illicit small arms was clearly on the minds of delegates during the long five day sessions of the BMS. An ATT, of course, would do little in the immediate term to address the problem of societies that are awash in older, but still quite lethal weapons. But the fact that so many of the representatives to the ATT will have been at the BMS improves prospects for government-sponsored resolutions that insist on regulation of the trade of small arms while doing more to dry up the still massive stocks of illicit arms that continue to fuel criminal and other abusive behavior.

Despite the long hours and efforts to build consensus (highlighted by warm applause for the representative of Liberia for encouraging others to support a consensus outcome), the final document for the 4th BMS was notable for its numerous omissions and sometimes narrow priorities. Not surprisingly, many NGOs were more supportive of government positions that could not reach the level of consensus—including illicit manufacturing, civilian protection, gender concerns, victim assistance, and security sector reform—than with many of the consensus provisions. Many of us were also intrigued by those government statements that endorsed ‘culture of peace’ priorities and recognized the links between illicit arms and social development. While we were realistic about the limits of consensus at this BMS, we (and this includes many diplomats) had hoped for a document that we could more easily ‘shop’ to constituents eager for policy movement on small arms as one tangible recognition by the international community of the many human victims and social disruptions that illicit arms has created and continues to create.

There will likely be much comment on the final outcome document over these next weeks. For us, two things stand out. First, despite the fine work of Federico Perazza, the borders consensus produced overly technical and enforcement-driven priorities with little commentary (and that merely a reference to ‘social and economic integration’) to indicate that delegates understand the urgent need to preserve the many human interactions that require accessible borders while governments and regional organizations also seek to address border ‘porosity.’

In addition, and again in recognition of the fine work of Sarah de Zoeten, the ‘cooperation’ consensus was almost entirely driven by state priorities and state actors. Not only was civil society nearly absent from the final document (aside from some references to our capacity to support governments and suggest good ‘matches’ for assistance), there was virtually no reference to the specific skills of civil society in diverse global regions that can serve as a supplement to state-sponsored initiatives. This is not about ‘culture of peace’ activities alone, nor is it solely about having NGOs present in the negotiating rooms. Rather it is about mediators, conflict resolution experts, victims’ services personnel, women’s rights advocates and other civil society leaders who are able to train and involve citizens to do more locally to identify, highlight, remove and help repair the damage from illicit weapons. The excellent language in the document pertaining to cooperation and coordinated action with regional and international bodies could well have been enhanced by adding civil society to the core list of collaborators.

The process of strengthening follow-up mechanisms suggested in large part by Ambassador Macedo will indeed be enhanced by timely government reporting on their efforts to implement the PoA, by a review of and commitment to the use of new UN and other tools and mechanisms, and by preparations for 2011 and 2012 that highlight key issues and agenda items in a timely manner and with sufficiently lengthy formal meetings to allow discussions and negotiations on agreements that are both more inclusive and more binding.

At the same time, as mandated by the GA, cooperation and assistance will remain front and center for delegates responsible for small arms negotiations. After we’ve all caught our breath, we should strive together to create a more workable relationship for civil society that puts new skills and fresh perspectives into the policy and action mix.

Day 5: Outcome document adopted

by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

During a procedurally confusing Friday, the Chair of BMS4, Ambassador Macedo of Mexico, pleaded with delegations to adopt the draft outcome document without reopening the text with such limited time left. Though supported by the vast majority of delegations, who argued that they would not have time to get instructions from capital if substantive changes were made, a few delegations requested the opportunity to go through the text section by section to suggest amendments. Deliberations on how to proceed consumed all of the morning and afternoon meetings; in the end, a few delegates did manage to suggest changes, but most were able to work these out bilaterally between concerned individuals. While other delegates continued pressuring the Chair to open the text futher, a suggestion by the Egyptian delegate to add a description of the process to the technical part of the document saved the day. The paragraph read:

The Chairman presented to delegations a draft outcome document prepared with the assistance of the Friends of the Chair in thorough informal consultations with delegations. He appealed to delegations not to open the draft for discussion and requested its adoption as an outcome of the BMS4, while noting that such procedure will not represent a precedent in future meetings of the Programme of Action.

At five minutes to 6, the document was adopted by consensus. Analysis of the document will follow over the next few days on this blog.

What is the BMS?

by Glynis Beaton, Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA), Guyana

BMS4: What exactly is this and of what concern is it to me? These were some of the questions I asked myself.

My home country had no report, online. I had no idea of my country's position and never saw my representative. Of what concern was this process to my country and my organization the Young Women's Christian Association?

Answers:

As it turns out, BMS4 was of major concern to me, my organization and my country. All my concerns were answered at this meeting. It was thrilling to see the cooperation among nations in preparing some of the statements. This cooperation gave me the impetus to return home and fully implement the POA, especially the sections on gender which are of primary concern to my organization.

Moreover, my meetings with other colleagues, with the Ambassador from Jamaica, and with representatives from CARICOM yielded much value towards stronger collaborations in the near future.

Thanks to IANSA's daily meetings and updates via email, we were kept on our toes regarding the important issues that we needed to keep our sights on.

Thanks, Thanks, Thanks! The BMS was worth my time and energies.

Optional Protocols

by Robert Zuber, Global Action to Prevent War

Yesterday’s discussions inside and outside Conference Room 2 focused on tools that can bring us closer to a regulatory framework of laws, regulations, law enforcement structures and information infrastructure to move us closer to an effective international tracing system. The working non-paper by William Kullman and the subsequent discussion he led in the BMS made clear once again that the UN and member states have at their disposal high levels of technical expertise needed to maintain a robust and transparent International Tracing Instrument—complete with comprehensive, accurate reporting mechanisms—to effectively address the ‘misuse and proliferation’ of Small Arms and Light Weapons.

As ably summarized on this Blog by Ray Acheson, discussions identified a range of stakeholders with resources and ‘best practices’ to share towards an effective and reliable ITI. States have done some important work in creating national and cross-border marking and tracing systems backed by robust legislation and enforcement. An important example of state leadership was provided through a side event by Heather Sutton and Daniel Mack of Instituto Sou da Paz who shared findings from their excellent study: “Implementing Brazil’s ‘Disarmament Statute’: Putting Law into Practice”.

In addition to states, NGOs and civil society groups are contributing much to research and information systems that can help us keep track of small arms movements and help build local capacity to assist officials in eliminating arms trafficking and (as Sou de Paz has done) craft effective laws and regulations. For instance, an extraordinary new resource for information sharing accessible to both experts and community practitioners was on display in the ECOSOC chambers where Philip Alpers and Marcus Wilson previewed Gunpolicy.org for the BMS community. Their resource offers important trans-national data and perspectives (in partnership with the Small Arms Survey and other agencies) that is quickly proving invaluable to policymakers and practitioners.

Of course, having resources and using them to full benefit are not necessarily the same. For persons outside the UN system (and for many within) a major sticking point as they assess UN-based efforts to create effective international instruments is their ‘optional’ nature. Most people don’t understand much of how the UN functions and more specifically the small, cumulative steps towards trust building and transparency that must be taken seriously if states are to shed some of their sovereign concerns and enter into binding international agreements. At the same time, diplomats and even NGOs sometimes lose touch with the urgent needs of communities that can be more successfully addressed through robust, binding measures. While pushing states to make as many concessions to national interest as possible to create legally binding instruments that can effectively combat the illicit trade in small arms and its damaging effects on communities, we can do more to stimulate understanding of the difficult lines that diplomats must sometimes straddle on their way to finally endorsing such instruments.

As at least one delegate noted yesterday, we can and must get to the point where we can reasonably assume that any unmarked weapon is an illicit weapon. This requires levels of state and civil society vigilance backed by robust technology and information systems sanctioned at the international level. It also requires steady progress towards making the optional, mandatory.

Weapons or Wellbeing?

by Allison Pytlak, Religions for Peace

The answer to that question might sound a touch obvious, but for many organizations who follow arms control, disarmament and development issues we know that this is unfortunately not so. In an effort to bridge the dialogue on those subjects as well as the main actors within it, Religions for Peace and UN Millennium Campaign jointly presented a side event called “Weapons or Wellbeing? Advancing MDGs by Cutting Military Spending” on 14 June in the UN Church Centre.

Moderated by Ms. Deepika Singh, Director of Programs at Religions for Peace, the event also included Ms. Christiane Abogdon-Johnson of United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and Mr. Sering Falu Njie, Deputy Director, UN Millennium Development Goals Campaign. Both presenters gave thorough examinations of the relationship between military expenditure, conflict, poverty and disarmament. After thus outlining the problem, Mr. Stein Villumstad, Deputy Secretary General at Religions for Peace, put forward a possible solution in the way of ‘shared security’. This framework—in which development, national security and respect for human rights are advanced simultaneously and in good faith—puts human welfare and human security well ahead of the type of safety provided by weapons alone.

This side event was also an opportunity for Religions for Peace to present the text for a new United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that it has drafted, which asks member states to cut military spending at a rate of 1% per annum over ten years, and convert those funds toward achievement of the MDGs. This reflects an important and necessary progression from existing UNGA resolutions on ‘disarmament and development’ that are less specific in their demands. This draft includes a time bound commitment and a defined reduction amount.

This resolution has been advanced by the Religions for Peace Global Youth Network, as part of their Arms Down! Campaign for Shared Security. Mr. Errick Lutambwe Milindi, from the African Interreligious Youth Network, represented the youth during the side event. As he explained, the campaign has already collected over 2 million signatures on a global petition that also asks governments to reduce military expenditure in favour of increased development spending. These signatures will be presented at the United Nations when the campaign ends in October.

Day 4: International Tracing Instrument

by Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

On Thursday, 17 June, delegates to BMS met to consider and adopt an annex to the BMS4 outcome document on the “Implementation of the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons,” otherwise known as the International Tracing Instrument (ITI).

William Kullman of the United States prepared a discussion paper on this subject (WP.4) in advance of BMS4. On Thursday morning, delegations delivered interventions in response to his paper and on the ITI in general, during which most representatives spoke about the importance of the full implementation of the ITI. Though the Instrument is not legally-binding, it is considered by most states to be an important mechanism for implementing the UN Programme of Action (UNPoA) and curbing the illicit trade in small arms.

Several delegations suggested new or strengthened mechanisms to promote the Instrument’s implementation. The Belgian delegation suggested that states should increase sharing of information on traced illicit arms, arguing that this information provides a way to identify potential traffickers and routes and can help those making decisions on arms transfer licences reduce the risk of diversion. The Belgian delegation also noted that if the arms trade treaty to be negotiated in the coming years contains criterion on the risk of diversion, it would, combined with improved exchange of information on tracked illicit small arms, would be a major step forward for combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW).

In this regard, Switzerland’s ambassador suggested the establishment of national focal points to improve the exchange of information on traced illicit weapons and called for the enhancement of INTERPOL’s electronic tracing tools. The Swiss delegation also highlighted the module on tracing of SALW in the International Small Arms Control Standards project, which is intended to standardize tracing activities and facilitate collaboration between states.

Many delegations urged the improvement of tracing mechanisms, the establishment of multilateral platforms to share tracing requests and information, and increased assistance to states for marking and tracing tools, equipment, and procedures. Other delegations pointed out existing lacunae in the legal norms and laws preventing trafficking in SALW; for example, Morocco’s delegation suggested the consolidation of efforts to curb the illegal trade in SALW through the formulation of an instrument on illicit brokering. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) urged states to mark and trace their weapons collected after armed conflict, which is not currently a required practice. The ICRC also recommended that government experts directly involved in implementing the ITI meet on a regular basis to share their experiences and consider the Instrument’s implementation.

After these inventions, Mr. Kullman moderated a paragraph-by-paragraph review of the draft annex on the ITI, which begins on page 10 of the consolidated draft outcome document. Though the review continued until after the 6:00 PM official close of business, it did not result in any major substantive changes to the text. The annex essentially notes what states said in the context of BMS4 or in their national reports related to implementation of the ITI and outlines “understandings” reached by states at the meeting, which include, among other things:

• that establishing the legal framework is not enough without the technical and human capacity to implement the International Instrument, and therefore, states in a position to do so were called upon to render, upon request, technical, financial, and other assistance in building national capacity in the areas of marking, record-keeping, and tracing, and in the development of national legislation, regulations, or administrative procedures;

• that states were encouraged to designate national points of contact to exchange information and to enhance interaction between these points of contact at the bilateral, regional, and international levels;

• that states were encouraged to use the proposed UN template for reporting on their implementation of the ITI;

• that states were encouraged to support the role of the UN in promoting the ITI and the role of INTERPOL in implementing the ITI;

• that the PoA-ISS can be a useful tool for the implementation and reporting procedures for the ITI; and

• that states were encouraged to strengthen efforts by regional organizations to support the ITI.

The annex was adopted at the end of the meeting and the full and final text will be available in the new version of the consolidated outcome document, which will be released later Thursday evening.